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Abstract—
In this paper, we present a systematic survey on the con-
textual information based proximity detection techniques. These
techniques are heavily used for improving security and usability
in Zero-Interaction based Co-presence Detection and Authen-
tication (ZICDA) systems. In particular, the survey includes a
discussion on the possible adversary and communication models
along with the existing security attacks on ZICDA systems, and
it reviews the state-of-the-art proximity detection techniques that
make use of contextual information. These proximity detection
techniques are commonly referred to as Contextual Co-presence
(COCO) protocols, which dynamically collect and use contextual
information to improve the security of ZICDA systems during
the proximity verification process. Finally, we summarize the
significant challenges and suggest possible innovative and effi-
cient future solutions for securely detecting co-presence between
devices in the presence of adversaries. The proximity verification
techniques presented in the literature usually involve trade-offs
between metrics such as efficiency, security, deployment cost, and
usability. At present, there is no ideal solution which adequately
addresses the trade-off between these metrics. Therefore, we
trust that this review gives an insight into the strengths and
shortcomings of the known research methodologies and pave
the way for the design of future practical, secure, and efficient
solutions.
Index Terms—Relay attack, Zero-interaction authentication,
Context-aware, Sensor modalities, Distance bounding, RFID,
Proximity detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there are many industrial applications which
grant specific services and privileges based on the physical
proximity of the communicating devices. For instance, we use
contactless smartkey to unlock our car, even to start the engine
without inserting the key. These industrial applications use the
most popular short-range communication technologies known
as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [1] and Near Field
Communication (NFC) [2], for establishing contact between
the communicating pairs. Other widely used applications that
use short-range contactless smartcards based on RFID or NFC
include supply chain management, e-passport [3], access cards
(such as building, parking, highway toll fee collection and
public transport [4]), medical implants, Point-of-Sale (PoS)
systems [5], to name a few. Moreover, the smartcard-based
access control systems that require proximity verification and
authentication are also being deployed in safety and security-
critical infrastructures such as military research facilities and
nuclear power plants. Therefore, it is essential to secure such
systems against all types of adversaries. The main reason for
the popularity of contactless authentication systems compared
to contact-based smartcard systems is their higher overall user
experience concerning ease in manageability and usability.
However, due to the inherent weaknesses in underlying wire-
less communication, the RFID/NFC systems are exposed to
a wide variety of security and privacy attacks [6]. Thus, it
subverts the security and usability advantages offered by these
authentication systems.
The so-called relay attacks are one of the many distance
hijacking attacks that exploit the radio communication tech-
nology of RFID/NFC systems [7] [8] [9]. In relay attacks,
a proxy device (often referred to as ghost) that emulates a
contactless smartcard is placed near the reader to impersonate
a victim’s card within the proximity to the reader. On the
other end of the communication point, a mole (often referred
to as leech) that acts as a reader is placed near to the victim
card [10]. Both of these malicious devices are in control of an
adversary. The proxy forwards all the messages to the mole
which act as a fake authentic reader for the victim card. The
distance between the proxy and mole can be increased as far
as the communication delay is kept sufficiently short. Example
of instances that show the vast existence of relay attacks
are demonstrated in [11]. Authors in [11] show a successful
relay attack over more than 300 miles, and the authors in [8]
demonstrate relay attacks on passive keyless entry and start
for over 50 meters. Furthermore, in [12], the successful relay
attacks over more than 110 meters are demonstrated using
three NFC smartphones.
To overcome the above mentioned inherent vulnerabilities
and attacks on contactless communication systems, various
researchers are working towards different defense techniques.
The proposed techniques try to preserve the fundamental
properties such as zero-interaction and usability of the systems
while ensuring the protection from the distance hijacking
attacks. The two most commonly found defense techniques
in the state-of-the-art are the contextual co-presence [13] [14]
and the distance bounding [15] [16] [17] protocols. Both these
protocols provide zero-interaction authentication [18] by using
co-presence detection as an additional security measure on top
of the basic authentication process.
In this paper, the co-presence detection techniques that are
based on distance bounding protocols are considered out of
the scope. It is because we aim to review only the applica-
tions that make use of resource-constrained (e.g., smartcards
and smartkeys) and commodity devices (e.g., smartphones
and tablets) as provers and verifiers. The distance bounding
needs to be implemented at the lowest possible layer in the
communication stack because even a small error in estimating
processing time at the prover-side can lead to significant
deviations in the distance bound. Therefore, implementing
distance bounding on commodity devices like ordinary smart-
phones might be a challenge. However, we direct the interested
readers toward the following comprehensive distance bounding
research works [19] [20].
A. Motivation and Contributions
Considering the higher potential damage such as an unau-
thorized entry in a secure and sensitive facility, stealing a car,
credit card frauds, and skipping tolls, which could be caused
by exploiting the vulnerabilities in co-presence systems. Thus,
these systems require robust and secure authentication models.
Over the years, researchers have proposed many solutions
based on distance bounding and context-aware information
protocols, which develop patches to fix the identified vulnera-
bilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
which provides an extensive overview of the attacks and
their prevention techniques for ZICDA access control systems.
However, some efforts have been made to describe the problem
and its possible solutions within one specific protocol such as
distance bounding protocols for distance based attacks [19], or
within a particular communication technology like RFID [21].
But, these state-of-the-art survey articles does not sufficiently
cover the details of all the ongoing attacks and their proposed
solutions on proximity-based systems. For instance, in [22],
authors discuss the feasibility of implementation and the
corresponding security implications for various active and
passive relay attacks, and in [23], the authors present a
brief survey on multiple attacks and their countermeasures
using distance bounding protocols with IEEE 802.15.4a (i.e.,
Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband). Additionally, [22] and [23]
are outdated given the extensive research that has been done
in the last few years on the security of co-presence systems. It
is because the attack vector has been increased significantly in
recent years due to the rapid deployment of zero-interaction
systems in various real-world scenarios such as health-care,
PoS, and keyless car entry. Hence, we firmly believe that a
comprehensive survey is essential for an audience who plans
to initiate their research work in this direction. Our paper
does not attempt to solve any new challenges but presents
an overview and discussion on security threats and their
countermeasures in ZICDA systems. We believe that we have
taken here the required initial steps that will help understand
how to make full use of the contextual information to provide
flexibility, and to strength decision making in access control
systems.
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive survey
on co-presence detection techniques. To this end, the major
contributions of our work are as follows.
• We discuss the key security problems that affect the use
of contactless smartcards in ZICDA systems. We review
security threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks specific to
these systems. In particular, we survey the literature over
the period 2000-2018 by focusing our attention on the
impact analysis of security attacks performed on ZICDA
systems.
• We present a general architecture for ZICDA system,
which includes its characteristics, deployment challenges,
and applications. Furthermore, we discuss the communi-
cation and adversary system models that are being used in
ZICDA systems. In particular, we assist interested readers
in understanding the existing challenges in the deploy-
ment of ZICDA systems, estimate the possible damages
caused by the adversaries, and improve the techniques
for proximity detection and containment processes. Fur-
thermore, we provide an overview concerning feasibility,
robustness, and effectiveness for the existing and potential
attacks over ZICDA systems, and we examine the risks
for users of these systems.
• Finally, we present a survey of the state-of-the-art secu-
rity solutions for detecting co-presence using contextual
information (i.e., contextual co-presence protocols). We
further extend our survey by including the co-presence
detection techniques that also emphasize on the impor-
tance of privacy preservation (mainly regarding user lo-
cation) during the access control authentication processes
in Location-Based Services (LBS). Please note that in this
paper only context-aware security solutions with respect
to ZICDA systems have been considered for survey,
and we have not surveyed the context-aware solutions
that are used for improving the security and privacy
of users in other application domains such as mobile
applications [24] [25], Internet of Things (IoT) [26],
Industrial IoT [27], and future wireless networks [28].
Additionally, we discuss how the existing approaches
ensure fundamental security requirements and protect
communications in the ZICDA systems together with the
open challenges and strategies for future research work
in the area.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the overview of ZICDA systems, which include its
characteristics and applications. In the same section, we also
discuss details about communication model, authentication
system, and adversary model used for proximity verification
of communicating devices in a ZICDA system. Furthermore,
at the end of the Section II, we discuss all the existing attacks
and their impacts on the ZICDA systems. In Section III, we
review existing solutions, which are proposed for detecting the
co-presence between the communicating devices. We broadly
discuss the proximity detection techniques that are based on
contextual co-presence protocols. In Section IV, we present
open issues and directions for future work. Finally, Section V
concludes our work.
II. ZERO-INTERACTION BASED CO-PRESENCE DETECTION
AND AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we present the overview of a generic func-
tional model of Zero-Interaction based co-presence Detection
and Authentication (ZICDA) access control system. First, we
introduce the deployment techniques that have been used in a
ZICDA system. Then, we discuss the standard communication
and adversary model for ZICDA systems.
A. Overview of ZICDA system
A ZICDA system represents a specific set of contactless
access control systems in which the access-seeking entity (e.g.,
smartcard, smartkey, and smartphone) will implicitly prove
their co-presence with the verifier along with its authentica-
tion credentials. For instance, Passive Keyless Entry (PKE)
system, which is also named as “Smartkey” system is an
automobile’s electronic lock to its doors and ignition system.
In PKE system, the driver carries a token (i.e., smartkey)
that communicates (using RFID technology) with car’s access
control system to unlock the doors and activate the ignition,
only if, the token’s authenticity and proximity are successfully
verified.
Verifying the proximity along with the authenticity is nec-
essary for ZICDA systems. Otherwise, these systems become
vulnerable to various type of Man-In-the-Middle (MIM) at-
tacks such as eavesdropping, distance-hijacking, data corrup-
tion and manipulation, and relay attacks. One way to detect
proximity is through received signal strength, but an adversary
can easily manipulate signal strength through active relays.
Authors in [21] provide study depicting that different types
of proximity-based access control systems are susceptible to
MIM attacks. Mainly, the relay attacks are successful in ten
car models from eight different vendors [8]. In addition to
vehicular systems, these attacks can easily target credit/debit
cards and smartphones, which uses NFC technology and
contactless smartcards.
B. Communication Technologies
In ZICDA systems, due to the resource-constrained nature
of prover (e.g., smartcard and smartkey), the following three
short-range and low-energy sensor technologies are commonly
used for communication between prover and verifier: (i) Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID), (ii) Near Field Communica-
tion (NFC), and (iii) Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Among
these three, NFC is used in a large array of applications
because it combines the security of BLE with the short-range
data transfer capabilities of RFID. For NFC to work, one
must tap or wave the smartphone (acts as NFC reader) against
an NFC tag to secure an object’s context or to perform an
action. For example, you could purchase chocolates just by
tapping your NFC reader against the box of chocolates. NFC-
capable devices such as a smartphone can work as a reader
as well as a tag. It is predicted that NFC will be used as a
key technology in realizing the Internet of Things (IoT) [29]
paradigm. It is due to the enhanced security features of NFC
such as a user can easily pair an NFC tag with another form
of authentication on hand (like the license in your wallet) to
create a two-pronged authentication system. The above feature
is particularly relevant in the health-care world [30], and it is
even being mandated by the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) as a standard security practice.
NFC is generally viewed as a finely honed subset of Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID). NFC operates at the same
frequency (i.e., 13.56 MHz) as high-frequency RFIDs, and it
performs many of the similar operations as RFID tags (and
readers) and contactless smartcards. The NFC can operate in
the following communication modes.
• Read/Write: In this mode, an NFC-enabled reader/writer
device (such as a smartphone) can read information from
the smart objects, and act upon the received information
to improve services provided by these smart objects.
By performing a simple touch of these devices to the
smart objects, the users can perform various tasks such
as short message service (SMS) texts without typing,
automatically connect to websites via a retrieved URL,
and get information about various relevant offers or obtain
coupons. This mode is beneficial for realizing the Internet
of Things (IoT) services.
• Peer-to-Peer: In this mode, one NFC-enabled
reader/writer device can communicate with another NFC-
enabled reader/writer device. One of the reader/writer
devices behaves as a tag to create the communication
link.
• Card emulation: While working in this mode, an NFC-
enabled reader/writer device can replace a contactless
smartcard, which enables NFC devices to be used within
the existing smartcard infrastructure for services such
as making payments at PoS, access control at building
entrance or for a vehicle, toll gates, and medical implants.
As NFC is a subset of RFID, the standards and protocols
for NFC are based on RFID standards as outlined in FeliCa,
ISO/IEC 14443 [31] and some are parts of ISO/IEC 18092.
These standards govern the use of proximity cards using RFID
technology.
C. Communication and Adversary Models
Figure 1 shows a generic communication model for ZICDA
systems. The communication model consists of two devices
namely prover (P ) and verifier (V ). To get access to the
system, P has to authenticate itself to V and also prove that P
is in close proximity to V . The authentication process between
the devices, i.e., P and V , triggers automatically when both
devices are nearby to each other. The communication traffic
between P and V is encrypted using a pre-shared secret key,
which is generated using either shared-key or private/public
key model. The P encrypt its authentication information
using the secret key before transmitting it to V . Depending
upon the application and system implementation, a “credential
verification” function make the authentication decision for P
at V either locally or remotely as shown in Figure 1. For
example, in a PoS application, a user (i.e., P ) performs the
contactless payment using her NFC-enabled smartphone at
a PoS terminal. In this specific application, the “credential
verification” function is stored at the web server of a bank
whose credit card is being used for the payment at PoS
terminal. Other applications such as locking/unlocking a car
using a smartkey, where the “credential verification” function
is integrated with the terminal device itself. In ZICDA access
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Fig. 1. Communication model for ZICDA systems
control systems, the smartcard (i.e., a user token such as an
access card, key or mobile phone) acts as P , and the terminal
(i.e., a desktop computer, wall-mounted device or car system)
plays the role of V .
The adversary model for ZICDA systems is shown in
Figure 2. We assume that an adversary possesses following
standard Dolev-Yao [32] features and capabilities: a) adversary
(A) has complete control over the communication channel
used for authentication process between P and V , and b) A
has no physical access or possession of P and V , nor can A
compromise the functionality of P and V devices. Therefore,
none of the benign entities in the communication protocol
of ZICDA system can be tampered with or compromised.
However, A is allowed to stay close to V and P . The main
aim of A is to fool V into concluding that P is in proximity.
Figure 2 illustrates that an adversary (A) which resides
in the proximity of P and V can perform various types
of distance hijacking (i.e., distance-reduction or distance-
enlargement) attacks on the wireless channel between P and
V . First, A can intelligently place one device, called mole
(Av), in the proximity to P without P knowing about it.
Then, A places another device called, proxy (Ap), close to
V which emulates a contactless smartcard. Both Av and Ap
communicate using a high bandwidth channel. In this way, A
takes the form of a “mole-and-proxy” (or often called “ghost-
and-leech”) duo (Av , Ap), and it relays messages to and forth
between V and P . This process leads V to conclude that
P is in proximity and vice-versa. Therefore, such a simple
adversary model can fully compromise the security and privacy
of an ordinary ZICDA system without requiring any physical
access to the communicating devices nor does it requires the
authentication credentials.
D. Attacks vector for ZICDA Systems
Due to technological advancements in mobile devices and
radio frequency communications, a broad array of applications
such as contactless payments, keyless entry systems, smart
posters, to name a few, are deployed rapidly for mass-market
users. These applications use contactless authentication along
with the proximity verification between the communicating
devices for ensuring secure access control. The increased
overall user experience regarding ease in manageability and
usability are the main attractions of these applications. Un-
fortunately, the radio channel used for communication is
vulnerable to various security and privacy attacks such as
eavesdropping [33], relay attack [34] [35], impersonation [36],
and distance hijacking [37]. Thus, these attacks limit the
usability of co-presence techniques in various application
domains. To provide security against all types of attacks in
ZICDA systems is a challenging task. Ideally, a ZICDA system
should be protected against the following attacks.
• Mafia fraud: Mafia fraud attack [38], also called relay
or wormhole attack is first introduced by [39] and [40].
In this attack, the V and P are honest and far apart,
and an adversary tries to shorten the physical distance
between them. The adversary uses a similar attack sce-
nario as described in Figure 2, the attacker places a
proxy verifier (V ′) near P and a proxy prover (P ′) near
V . These proxies create an extended high bandwidth
communication link between V and P by relaying all the
communication messages between them. In this way, P ′
and V ′ make V and P to falsely conclude that both are in
close proximity. Traditional cryptographic-based security
techniques cannot prevent theMafia fraud attacks because
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Fig. 3. Distance fraud attack
the proxies (i.e., P ′ and V ′) need not to perform any
decryption or encryption on communication messages
nor they require to run any authentication process with
V and P . Thus, these proxies can create an effective,
transparent communication link between V and P . This
attack has been successfully demonstrated in various
ZICDA Systems in which NFC/RFID techniques are used
for communication between V and P .
• Distance fraud: In Distance fraud attacks [15], a sole
fraudulent prover (P ′) convince the honest verifier (V)
that she is at a different (usually shorter) distance than
she really is. Unlike Mafia fraud attack, here the prover
itself is dishonest, and only the verifier is a victim. Dis-
tance fraud attacks are most effective and disastrous for
real-time location-based systems (RTLS)1. Application
instances of RTLS include manufacturing, logistics, and
supply chain management, where expensive components
or parts of a final product and other important entities
involved are being tracked throughout the whole logistics
1RTLS are automated systems that determine the locations of assets.
process. A practical example of how Distance fraud at-
tacks can adversely affect the RTLS is shown in Figure 3.
In this scenario, three nodes (i.e., V x, V y and V z)
perform continuous tracking of the current location of
the node P using its received signal strength. We can
see from Figure 3 that if node P wants to be malicious,
it could pretend to be at position P ′ at the same time
when it is at P . To perform this action, P decreases its
signal strength when communicating with node V z while
it increases the signal strength when communicating with
V y. In this case, the verifier nodes V y and V z are unable
to detect the fraud of P because she is a legitimate node,
and she authenticates herself with true credentials.
• Terrorist fraud: A slightly different version of Distance
fraud attack in which a dishonest prover (P ′) attacks
the system with the help of a third party attacker (A)
is called Terrorist fraud [41]. In Terrorist fraud attack,
the P ′, which is far apart from an honest verifier (V ),
conspires with A, who is close to V to masquerade as the
honest prover by providingA with selected credentials for
authentication. Let’s consider an example, assume that A
is a terrorist who wants to cross the border. P ′ helps A in
answering the questions of the immigration officer (i.e.,
V ). Another example could be the one in which A help
P ′ in applications such as location forging. Assume a
scenario involving electronic monitoring using an ankle
bracelet. Terrorist fraud attack enables the subject (i.e.,
P ′) of the electronic monitoring system (i.e., V ) to leave
her residence with the help of A who stays close to V .
• Distance-hijacking: In Distance-hijacking attack [37], a
dishonest far-away prover (P ′) exploits one or more
honest close-by provers’ {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} to provide
a verifier V with false information about the distance
between P ′ and V . Consider a real-world scenario as
shown in Figure 4, in which several employees (i.e.,
{P1, P2, · · · , Pn}) work in a secure building. A main-
frame system (i.e., V ) containing sensitive information is
Fig. 4. Distance-hijacking attack
located inside the building. Any authorized employee can
get access to V through their contactless smartcard. To
complete the authorization process with V , an employee
needs to be in the building along with her valid creden-
tials. Now, assume that an adversary (P ′), which has a
(stolen) smartcard is sitting outside the building along
with a powerful antenna. To access V , P ′ already has the
valid security credentials, but P ′ also need to prove that
she is inside the building. For this purpose, P ′ performs
eavesdropping over the communication channel of the
distance bounding protocol, which is running between the
employee P1 and V . Distance bounding works in two
phases; in the first phase, the P needs to prove to V
that both are in proximity to each other. After successful
completion of the first phase, P authenticates itself to
V using valid credentials. To perform distance-hijacking
attack, P ′ jam the communication link between P1 and
V as soon as the first phase of the distance bounding is
completed. Then P ′ will complete the second phase on
behalf of P1 using her (stolen) credentials. In this way,
V now believes that the P ′ is in the building with valid
credentials, thus she is granted the access.
• Location cheating [42]: It is a colluding attack in which
a close-by helper and a far-away dishonest prover (P ′)
collude to prove that P ′ is close to verifier (V ). Location-
based services (LBS) led by foursquare2, GasBuddy3,
GyPSii4, Loopt5, and Dark Sky6 has attracted a lot of
attention in recent years. The LBS uses the geographical
position of a user to enrich user experience in a variety of
contexts such as location-based searching and location-
based mobile advertising. To attract more users, the
location-based mobile social networking services provide
rewards and offers to the user when it checks into
certain venues or locations. This gives incentives to
users to engage in location-cheating for their benefits.
Dishonest provers may obtain undeserving benefits at
specific venues (i.e., places like coffee shops, restaurants,
2http://www.foursquare.com
3https://www.gasbuddy.com/
4http://www.gypsii.com
5http://www.loopt.com
6https://darksky.net/app/
shopping malls, to name a few) by making multiple false
location check-ins at different times.
For example, Foursquare connect users to local businesses
like shops or restaurants by using their current loca-
tion information. Many business owners offer concrete
benefits such as free vouchers, special offers, and cash
rewards to the most active registrants visiting their shops
or restaurants. In such a scenario, a P ′ can perform
location-cheating attack by taking help from her friend
sitting in or near a restaurant. The close-by helper of P ′
will use the credentials of P ′ and prove her presence
along with the authentication to trick the V . A vast
array of LBS services use GPS locations that can be ob-
tained from a user’s smartphone. In such services, a user
performs location-cheating [42] by exploring the open
source operating systems of smartphones (e.g., Android)
to modify global-positioning-system-(GPS)-related appli-
cation programming interfaces (APIs). Once tempering is
done, a user can cheat on her location using falsified GPS
information.
III. CONTEXT-AWARE CO-PRESENCE DETECTION
TECHNIQUES
In this section, we present a comprehensive survey of
existing context-based co-presence detection techniques that
address one or more security threats discussed in Section II-D.
The basis of provisioning contextual security in ZICDA sys-
tems is the fact that all devices residing in the proximity
with each other will always “see” (nearly) the same phys-
ical and ambient environment (i.e., availability of suitable
context). With the recent advancements in the hardware of
mobile devices, these devices are now equipped with one
or more inbuilt “sensors” such as microphones (for audio),
wireless networking interfaces (for WiFi connectivity), global
positioning system (for location), Bluetooth (for short-range
communications), and other physical environment sensors
(humidity, gas, temperature and pressure/altitude). The data
collected using these sensors can be used as supplemental
information to improve security decisions in ZICDA systems.
With the information extracted from these sensors, the security
decisions can be taken dynamically at the time the decisions
are made. For this purpose, during the authentication process
in ZICDA systems, two honest communicating devices can
exchange and compare the dynamically gathered supplemental
information to determine their co-presence towards each other.
A. System Model for Context-based Access Control in ZICDA
Systems
Figure 5 depicts the generic system model for ZICDA
systems that are based on contextual co-presence detection
techniques. The main aim of most of the context-based ZICDA
systems is to provide security against relay attacks. We can
see from Figure 5 that the P and V will “see” (almost) the
same ambient environment if they lie in close proximity. When
either one of them leaves their common ambient environment,
the context gathered by P and V will not match during the
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GPS/GSM Bluetooth Audio/Video
Ambient environment
Contactless Smart 
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Fig. 5. Context-based co-presence Detection System
co-presence detection process, and the access to the system
will be denied (please refer to Figure 5).
The general working methodology framework for ZICDA
system models is shown in Figure 5. The framework functions
in two phases, in the first phase, when a P enters in the trans-
mission range (aka proximity) of a V , P sends a trigger to V .
Once triggered, V start the authentication process with P by
sending one (or more) challenge(s) (ch) to P , upon reception
of ch, P generate (using her private key) a response (rsp) and
send the rsp back to V . After successful authentication, in the
second phase, V and P initiate a context sensing process for
a pre-defined set of contexts for a fixed duration of t. The
context information collected by P within duration t can be
represented by a vector (ρ) such that ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 · · · ρn},
where n is the number of sensor modalities used to form the
contextual information. Similarly, ν = {ν1, ν2, ν3 · · · νn} is
the corresponding vector of n sensor modalities collected by
V . Based on the similarity index calculated using vectors ρ
and ν at V , the access of P to the system is either allowed or
denied. The effectiveness and correctness of the calculations
for the similarity index at V depends upon the feature extrac-
tion, classification, and machine learning methods used in the
process. The use of contextual security in the authentication
process not only improves the security of the system but also
provides flexibility in access control decisions.
A point worth mentioning here is the “initial delay” in
authentication process incurred due to the use of contextual
security. Due to this, a trade-off arises between system access
delay and its usability, i.e., a high delay will lead to lower
usability and vice-versa. This initial delay can be minimized
to some extent using the following approaches: (i) reduce the
number of context during the context-aware authentication.
However, it will decrease the level of security provided by the
system, and (ii) V can perform the credential and contextual
authentication processes for P in parallel, but if P uses a
low battery power device for authentication then this method
posses a high energy consumption and P needs to perform
frequent recharges, thus it reduces the usability of the system.
B. Context-based Co-presence Detection Framework
The basic requirements to achieve contextual security in
any access control system are (i) availability of contextual
information, (ii) efficient integration of available contextual in-
formation in runtime, and (iii) instant availability of contextual
information to security analysts. In practice, a typical major
obstacle in incorporating context into a security monitoring
program is the availability of the contextual information in
a format that supports integration with log and alert data.
Additionally, the contextual information needs to be validated
to ensure that it is accurate and has integrity. The ideal plat-
form integrates the data and information in real or near real-
time to allow not just the linkage of the data and knowledge
efficiently and effectively, but it also enables rules and complex
event processing that occurs due to the use of contextual
information. Finally, the platform must have the capability to
make the integrated information quickly and readily available
to security analysts to present a “scenario” (as discussed in
the earlier contactless smartcard examples) that provides all of
the information required to validate, respond to, and mitigate
incidents.
Figure 6 shows the interaction between the major compo-
nents involved in a generic Contextual Co-presence Security
Framework (CCSF). The existing proximity detection tech-
niques either use the whole or parts of the CCSF to verify the
co-presence between the communicating devices. The CCSF
apply context profiling and machine learning algorithms on
real-world reference dataset that is collected in an uncontrolled
environment, and it evaluates the effectiveness of automatic
and adaptive context classification for detecting co-presence.
For an access control system, the CCSF architecture is used for
training the classifier using the ground truth data. The trained
classifier will then used as a context comparator to compare
the contextual data that is received from a prover and verifier
at runtime. The CCSF can be instantiated depending upon the
requirements and applications of the underlying access control
system. We can see in Figure 6 that the CCSF mainly consists
of three major components namely, context data acquisition,
context management, and feature classification, and policy
management and enforcement. Below, we briefly discuss the
functioning and interactions among these three components.
• Context data acquisition: The CCSF architecture is
driven by the contextual information collected by this
component. The accuracy of the assessment of co-
presence detection depends highly on the data collection
and aggregation process used by the data acquisition
module. The contextual security refers to the use of addi-
tional information (i.e., context) to improve the security
at the time when security decisions are made. Therefore,
the context data sensing is done dynamically at the time
when a decision must be made for an access control
system. Depending upon the type of the application,
the communicating entities involved in the context-aware
authentication process needs to gather a set of predefined
contextual data types using their corresponding inbuilt
sensors. The sensed data by the verifier and the prover
devices is then compared to verify the co-presence be-
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Fig. 6. Overview of a Generic Contextual Co-presence Security Framework
tween them. The comparator must be trained, in advance,
using the ground truth data (or reference data) to provide
precise interpretation, analysis, and decision making. The
task of collecting the ground truth data is the main
aim of the context data acquisition component of CCSF.
Once collected, the reference data is passed to the next
component of CCSF (called context management and
feature classification) for training the classifier.
To gather contextual data, one can install an easy-to-use
and secure application on a large number of user devices.
The user devices involved in the data collection process
could be smartphones, tablets, or a specific purpose
device such as [43]. Data collection is a critical phase
of the framework because the number and quality of the
ground truth data that has been collected have a high
impact on the accuracy of the assessment of co-presence
detection. Data collection is a time-consuming, expensive,
and cumbersome process. To collect the reference data, an
onsite assert deployment is required. The data collection
could be done using the dedicated users (employees or
suppliers) or an approach such as crowd-sourcing, where
data collection is done by soliciting contributions from a
large group of people (self-selected volunteers or part-
time workers). In both cases, the users will have to
carry the data collection device with required sensing
capabilities (hardware or software). The former approach
is expensive, and the collected dataset will be of small
size, but the data will be trustworthy and of high quality.
While, the latter will collect data that is inexpensive
and it will have higher data quantity, but it will be less
secure and of low quality. In particular, to build a robust
and accurate CCSF, the collected reference data should
have characteristics such as high quality and quantity,
accuracy, timelinesses, and variability. Furthermore, there
are strict government issued guidelines (to support user
or information privacy) such as General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) that needs to be followed during
the process of data acquisition. Collecting real-world
reference data to train the classifiers and update them
periodically is one of the biggest challenges in context-
aware access control systems. Once the training phase
is complete and CCSF is ready to use, it is deployed in
the corresponding real-world applications. After CCSF
system deployment, the data collection component will
collect sensor data dynamically, only at the time when a
prover asks access for the access control system.
• Context management and feature classification: Dur-
ing the context-aware authentication phase the predefined
contextual data is collected by prover and verifier devices,
and it is sent to the context management and feature clas-
sification (CMFC) module. The CMFC module consists
of three components: data profiler, classifier, and training
dataset. Data profiling will help in quickly and thoroughly
unveiling the true content and structure of the observed
context data. The profiler will perform completeness,
uniqueness, values distribution, range, and pattern anal-
ysis on received data to ensure that it is of adequate
quality. Once analyzed properly, the profiler identifies the
most promising features (i.e., feature selection) to build a
feature vector describing the current context of the users.
The classifiers such as decisions trees, Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM), and K-Nearest Neighbours can
be trained under supervised learning using a reference
dataset. Once the training phase is over, the classifier uses
the context feature vectors, which are generated by the
profiler to classify new observations (i.e., sensor data)
concerning the current applications security and privacy-
related properties. The classifier outputs the classification
estimates and its associated confidence value, and these
are forwarded to policy management and enforcement
component, which considers them while making access
control decisions. The performance of the classifier will
directly influence both, security and usability, of the un-
derlying access control system. In particular, the security
of a system is determined by the False-Positive rate
(i.e., erroneously established co-presence between far-
away devices), while the usability is represented by the
False-Negative rate (i.e., incorrectly established non-co-
presence between nearby devices).
• Policy management and enforcement: This compo-
nent provide final decisions on the on-going context-
aware authentication process between prover and verifier
devices. The policy management module uses the in-
built policies along with the received confidence value
to enforce suitable policies on the verifier. Depending
on the type and number of policies enforced by this
module, different users can receive varying levels of
security access on the same access control system. For
instance, a server can be only accessed if the user is
within its proximity, but once access to the server is
granted, different users can have different rights on the
functionalities of the server. In such a scenario, the
proximity check is coupled with the individual users’
security policies, and therefore, the policy enforcement
at the time of context-aware authorization is required.
In the next section, we will discuss the state-of-the-art
context-aware co-presence detection techniques that utilize,
partially or wholly, multiple components from our above-
discussed CCSF architecture.
C. Co-presence Detection using Contextual Information
In this section, we discuss the co-presence detection tech-
niques that use contextual information during the proximity
verification process to improve the security of the target
access control system. The contextual information is collected
using one or more sensor modalities that reside in the prover
device(s). In recent years, the use of mobile devices for
spontaneous communications increases significantly in various
applications. Therefore, securing these communications from
multiple attacks such as relay attack, eavesdropping, and
impersonation becomes a vital precondition. For instance,
an attacker can read, relay, and modify messages between
communicating peers without either peer suspecting that the
communication between them has been tempered. The use
of contextual security as an additional layer on top of the
traditional security can help to prevent such malicious third
party attacks, as apparently, no user want their private infor-
mation being leaked or tampered with. The primary motivation
for the researchers to develop context-aware solutions is the
rapidly ongoing technological and hardware advancements
that enable many RFID/NFC tags to be equipped with many
low-cost sensing capabilities. Over recent years, sensors with
various sensing capabilities have been incorporated in RFID
tags [77] [78]. For instance, Intel’s Wireless Identification
and Sensing Platform (WISP) [79] [80] has developed tag
with various sensing capabilities, and this extends the use
of RFID beyond simple identification. With the help of these
advanced RFID devices, one can efficiently provide numerous
promising applications for pervasive sensing and computation.
It also paves the way towards providing improved security
and privacy services by leveraging contextual information
from the existing physical environment. Tables I and II de-
picts the state-of-the-art context-aware co-presence detection
techniques along with their short description and some other
related information such as the sensor modalities used for
content gathering, the communication channel(s) considered
between the prover and verifier, and the support provided by a
proposed approach is specific to an application, or it is generic,
and the support for user privacy (where applicable) is provided
or not.
The use of contextual information to improve the security
of access control applications is not a new technique. For
example, the banking authentication system uses time and
location as contextual information to provide an additional
security layer in online transactions. In this scenario, assume
a customer that wants to transfer all her funds to a third-party
account. The transaction appears genuine, i.e., the customer
has authenticated itself correctly to the bank, she is accessing
an account for which she is authorized, and the third-party
bank account appears valid too. However, the access location
or time of the transaction looks suspicious, e.g., the account
has been accessed from a location which is far from the
home location of the customer or the activation time of the
transaction is not consistent with the previous transactions
timestamp pattern of the customer. Therefore, without the
additional context, the bank is unable to determine if the
activity is fraudulent or not.
The use of contextual information to improve the security of
access control systems has rapidly increased in recent years,
and it is mainly due to the advancements in the mobile device
and communication techniques, which makes the availability
of the content more accessible to these systems. In [81],
the authors propose an approach that provides additional
security using context in role-based access control (RBAC)
systems. In particular, the main aim is to combine contextual
security (by using location and time as context) and role-
based access control to retail business processes, which uses
the RFID technology for inter-communication. Furthermore,
in [82], authors propose a context-aware security architecture
for emerging applications, and in [83] a context-aware remote
security control for mobile communication devices has been
proposed. In both these works, the contextual information such
as location, time, and network access points (like WiFi) is
used to improve security. It is done by dynamically setting the
security policies for individuals based on their current threat
levels.
In [47] and [75], authors propose context-based security
techniques that uses onboard tag sensors to collect contextual
information (location and speed). The proposed techniques
minimize the likelihood of unauthorized reading and relay
attacks in RFID Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) and bank-
ing access control systems. In [75], the context data sensed
through GPS sensors is used to develop a context-aware
selective unlocking technique for tags at ETC such that they
can selectively respond to reader challenges.
In [50], authors propose a proximity-based authentication
technique called “Amigo”. To authenticate co-present mobile
devices, Amigo uses knowledge of their shared radio envi-
ronment as proof of physical proximity. The key advantages
of Amigo include the following: (i) it does not require any
additional hardware, (iii) it does not require user involvement
in the authentication process, and (iii) it is not vulnerable to
eavesdropping. The main idea is that the co-present devices
will simultaneously monitor a common set of ambient radio
sources (WiFi access points or cell phone base stations) to
TABLE I
CONTEXT-AWARE CO-PRESENCE DETECTION TECHNIQUES - I
Proposals Communication
channel
Sensor modalities Privacy
preserva-
tion
support
Application
specific
Description
[44] RFID magnetometers,
accelerometer,
GPS
No No design context-aware
selective unlocking
mechanisms and secure
transaction verification
[45],
[46]
RFID/NFC audio, ambient
light
No No determine the
proximity by
correlating certain
sensor data extracted
from the two devices
[47] RFID GPS Yes PoS location-aware secure
transaction verification
scheme
[48] [49] RFID audio No PKES sound-based
proximity-detection
method
[50] RFID/NFC WiFi (radio waves) No No authenticate co-located
devices based on their
shared radio
environment
[51] [52] RFID/NFC temperature,
single-bit
round-trip
N/A No elliptic curve-based
mutual authentication
protocol
[53] Bluetooth
/RFID/NFC
audio, WiFi, and
GPS
No No comparing and fusing
different sensor
modalities in ZIA
systems
[54] [55] Bluetooth
/NFC
ambient noise and
luminosity
No IoT
domains
secure ZIA pairing
suitable for IoT and
wearable devices
[56] N/A GPS, WiFi Yes mobile ap-
plications
detection against
device misuse and
sensory malware
[57] N/A audio and
luminosity
N/A proofs-of-
presence
(PoPs)
solutions against
context guessing
attacks in LBS
[58] [59] RFID/NFC accelerometer,
gyroscope
N/A access
control
systems
authorized reference
trajectories on
Transparent
Authentication (TA)
schemes
[60] WiFi trajectory through
a road network
(gyroscope signal,
and GPS)
Yes VANETs technique to verify the
ongoing co-presence of
vehicles in an urban
environment
[13] RFID/NFC WiFi, Bluetooth,
GPS, and audio)
No No investigate the
performance of
different sensor
modalities for
co-presence detection
TABLE II
CONTEXT-AWARE CO-PRESENCE DETECTION TECHNIQUES - II
Proposals Communication
channel
Sensor modalities Privacy
preserva-
tion
support
Application
specific
Description
[61] [62]
[63] [64]
Bluetooth/
RFID/NFC
artificial ambient
environments
(infrared light,
sound, etc)
N/A time-
restricted
contactless
transac-
tions
evaluated the
effectiveness of 17
ambient sensors
[65] N/A bidirectional
sensing and
comparing button
presses and
releases behaviour
N/A EMV
contactless
payments
detection based on
sensing button presses
on the user’s
smartphone by both
transaction devices
[66] Bluetooth magnetometer N/A device
pairing
pairing smartphones by
exploiting correlated
magnetometer readings
[67] [68]
[69]
NFC accelerometer No Yes PoS and context-based
technique to prevent
mafia attack in mobile
NFC payment
[70] NFC audio and light Yes payment
cards
secure proximity
detection techniques
[71] N/A electromagnetic
signals
Yes LBS privacy-preserving
proximity testing
[72] RFID/NFC ambient
temperature,
precision gas,
humidity, and
altitude
No PoS use of purely ambient
physical sensing
capabilities in
authentication systems
[73] RFID/NFC Features-
fusion [53], and
decisions-fusion
No No systematic assessment
of co-presence
detection in the
presence of
context-manipulating
attacker
[74] RFID/NFC speech
recognition, and
location sensing/
classification
Yes payment
systems
defend against
unauthorized reading
and relay attacks
[75] RFID features-fusion and
decisions-fusion
based on majority
voting
Yes ETC
systems
unauthorized reading
and relay attacks
detection in RFID ETC
systems
[64] WiFi,
Bluetooth,
infra-red
accelerometer No smartcard continuous two-factor
authentication
[14] [76] Bluetooth audio No online
banking
a usable and
deployable two-factor
authentication
mechanism
perceive a similar radio environment. An evaluation conducted
using WiFi-enabled laptops show that Amigo is robust against
a range of passive and active attacks. To further strengthen
the fact that co-present devices will see the common radio
environment, fluctuations in the signal strength of existing
ambient radio sources are considered in [84]. It shows a
reduction in false positives and false negatives in the system.
In [85], authors present a system called NearMe. NearMe
discovers what is already nearby and to augment context
for ubiquitous computing. For this purpose, NearMe server
determines proximity by comparing a list of WiFi access points
and signal strengths called “WiFi signatures” from its clients.
To use NearMe, each client has to perform the following three
functions: (i) register with proximity server, (ii) report recent
WiFi signature, and (iii) query nearby places and peoples. A
similar proximity testing system which uses WiFi access points
and Bluetooth signals to generate “location tags” is introduced
in [71]. The system was implemented and evaluated on the
Android platform. Along with security, it also guarantees the
privacy preservation for the clients involved in it.
Based on the audio and light data collected from the ambient
sensors that are available in NFC enabled smartphones, a
secure proximity technique is presented in [70]. The main
aim is to prevent relay attacks at point of sale (PoS) systems,
where just bringing the NFC enabled smartphone close to PoS
is sufficient to complete a transaction. In particular, authors
propose a transaction verification mechanism that can deter-
mine the proximity (or lack thereof) between honest verifier
and prover by comparing specific sensor data (audio or light),
which is extracted from the communicating devices. In [49],
a secure radio channel between communicating devices based
on similar audio patterns has been proposed to develop an
unobtrusive but cryptographically strong security mechanism.
Furthermore, in [74], authors use ambient audio for secure
device pairing on android mobile phones. In this work, audio
is used as a metric to generate a secure cryptographic key
that establishes communication between mobile distributed
devices.
The use of Secret Handshakes as context information rapidly
increases in a large array of applications that uses RFID or
contactless cards for access control purposes. The intuition
behind its use as the content is as follows. Let’s assume a
typical usage scenario such as RFID or contactless card-based
entry in a secure facility. When a prover wishes to enter in
an access-controlled building, she often subconsciously (thus,
increases the usability of the system) does a fixed set of
motions such as her left/right-hand reaches for her wallet,
draws her purse out or wave it near the door’s reader, and
take a pause. From the above use-case, one can observe if
it is possible for the RFID chip or contactless technology in
the access cards to somehow internally detect a pattern, which
depicts precisely when, how, and in what order these actions
were being performed. If this is the case, then it is possible
to install appropriate logic on the RFID tags and contactless
cards that would only allow access when these actions are
matched.
Based on the secret handshakes mechanism, several tech-
niques have been proposed over the years to combat various
distance-based attacks (please refer to Section II-D). To de-
tect and prevent Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, authors
in [69] propose a technique for device-to-device (e.g., phone
and handset) authentication that includes an additional layer
in a traditional security suite. It is done by adding additional
information in terms of shared movement patterns. A user
can simply generate various patterns by shaking the devices
together, and these patterns can be easily captured using ac-
celerometer sensors that are embedded in the communicating
devices. In particular, two methods that combine cryptographic
primitives with accelerometer data analysis are proposed to
establish secure radio channels by creating authenticated secret
keys. Further, in [45], authors propose context-aware mecha-
nisms to defend against the RFID unauthorized reading (by
using owner’s posture recognition as context information) and
relay attack reading (by using audio as context information).
Similarly, in [59] and [53], authors propose gesture and motion
recognition based techniques to defend against ghost-and-
leech (a.k.a. proxying, relay, or man-in-the-middle) attacks in
RFID tags and other contactless cards. All these techniques
increase the resilience of access control systems against a set
of proximity-based attacks. However, the issue of user privacy
caused by the gesture recognition process which involves the
sensitive user data (i.e., user’s biometric information) is not
adequately addressed in these works.
For the first time, authors in [13] systematically investigate
the impact of using a single as well as a set of sensor
modalities on proximity detection systems. First, a standard
data collection and processing framework similar to the one
we have described in Figure 6 is developed. The proposed
framework runs in realistic everyday setting to collect data,
which is then used to train the classifier. Second, the authors
compare the performance of four commonly available sen-
sor modalities (i.e., WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, and audio) using
various combinations, first individually and then in the sets
of two and four. The work provides a comparison regarding
resisting relay attacks in zero-interaction based access control
systems for each combination. The authors claim that WiFi
data as the context is better in opposing relay attacks when
compared to other sensor modalities, and the fusing of multiple
modalities further improve resilience against relay attacks.
However, the fusion of various modalities retains a high level
of system usability up to a certain point. We argue that with the
increase in the number of sensor modalities, the time required
to authenticate a prover and the complexity of context-aware
algorithms deployment increases. Thus, it decreases the usabil-
ity and feasibility of an access control system. In [13], to make
the proximity detection techniques more robust and versatile,
the authors motivate the need for a stronger adversarial model
in which the adversary can compromise the integrity of context
sensing mechanisms. For instance, an attacker can create fake
Wifi access points, add random noise, and it can modify
the purely ambient physical sensing capabilities [72] such as
ambient temperature, precision gas, humidity, pressure, and
altitude.
One of the most comprehensive works towards analyzing,
extending, and systematizing state-of-the-art tasks on context-
aware proximity detection under a stronger, but a realistic
adversarial model is presented in [73]. In this work, authors
present a systematic assessment of proximity detection in the
face of context-manipulating adversaries. It has been shown
that not only the content manipulation is possible, but an
attacker can consistently control and stabilize the values of
multiple, heterogeneous (e.g., acoustic and ambient physical
environment) sensors using low-cost, off-the-shelf equipment.
Thus, an attacker who can manipulate the context gains a
significant advantage in defeating access control systems that
are based on contextual security techniques.
Authors in [14] propose a representative approach called
Sound-Proof, a usable two factor authentication that leverages
ambient sound to detect co-presence between the phone (used
as a second authentication factor) and the browser (a login
terminal such as a banking website) running on a different
mobile device such as laptop or tablet. Sound-Proof claims to
found an optimal trade-off between the usability (i.e., it does
not require an interaction between the user and her phone)
and security (i.e., secure login on a browser in the presence
of remote attackers). In particular, Sound-Proof uses the audio
signatures collected from the microphones of the two devices.
Sound-Proof provides a useful security enhancement on top
of the traditional password-only authentication technique that
is commonly used to perform online banking transactions.
The only essential requirement in Sound-Proof is that the user
should keep her phone near to the laptop while doing the login
tasks. However, a weakness of the Sound-Proof is identified by
authors in [76]. In [76], authors show that to perform an attack,
the remote attacker does not have to predict the ambient sounds
near the phone as assumed in the Sound-Proof, instead, it can
deliberately make or wait for the phone to produce predictable
or previously known sounds (e.g., ringer, notification or alarm
sounds). Therefore, exploiting the weakness as mentioned
above, a full attack system can be launched to compromise
the security of Sound-Proof successfully.
Authors in [86] aims to authenticate messages in VANETs
through physical context comparison. The physical context
consists of the surface of the road that includes road conditions
such as bumps and potholes which can be measured using the
accelerometer. Later, the context is used to derive a secret key,
which is shared between the co-present vehicles. However,
the entropy of the context to generate the secret key and the
effect of different road surfaces remains unexplored. Thus, it
makes the security guarantees of the system unclear. Recently,
authors in [60] propose an approach to verify the ongoing
co-presence between two vehicles in an urban environment.
The method exploits the characteristics of a trajectory (using
gyroscope signals, GPS, etc.) through a road network. The aim
is to allow authenticity checks for safety-critical applications.
The approach requires a vehicle to share the same route as
a leading vehicle to become a verified following vehicle. Co-
present vehicles gain knowledge of verified neighbors as well
as the capability to authenticate their VANET messages. The
construction only reveals a driver’s trajectory to other co-
present vehicles, and therefore, it protects passengers privacy
against an eavesdropping attacker. The proposed approach op-
erates transparent to pseudonym schemes, and thus, it cannot
be exploited to attribute different messages to the same sender.
The proposal has been implemented as an Android application
to evaluate its performance in experiments involving two cars.
D. Co-presence Detection in Location-Based Services
One of the primary goals of pervasive computing is to build
service applications that are sensitive to the user’s current
context information. For example, location-based apps such
as Swarm, Foursquare, Glympse, and Google-now, which uses
the user location as a context to dynamically provide various
services (e.g., information of nearby places, friends, and
shops). One way to provide such services is to determine prox-
imity by measuring absolute locations and compute distances.
However, computing perfect location threatens user privacy,
and it is also not necessarily easy to calculate, especially
indoors, where GPS on user devices does not work well, which
is usually a place where people spend most of their time.
These Location-Based Services (LBS) use the approximate
geographical position to enrich user’s Quality of Experience
(QoE) concerning various contexts such as location-based
searching and location-based mobile advertising. To attract
more users, service providers give real-world rewards to the
user when it does check-in at a specific venue or location.
These rewards motivate users to cheat on their real locations.
In particular, LBSs can be defined as an array of services
available with mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and
smart-watch), tailoring their functionality to current positions
or trajectories of users or vehicles [87].
In [42], authors investigate vulnerabilities leading to possi-
ble location cheating attacks in LBS applications and discuss
possible countermeasures for the same. By using Foursquare
as a use-case scenario, a new location cheating attack is
proposed, which can easily cheat the current location ver-
ification techniques. The paper shows that if an attacker
carefully studies the open-source operating systems for mobile
devices such as Android to modify GPS-related application
programming interfaces (APIs), then the attacker can cheat
their location by altering the GPS information. While LBSs
offer great opportunities for a large array of customer-oriented
services, but at the same time, it also presents significant
privacy threats to the users. To strengthen the mechanisms for
preventing location-cheating in LBS, authors in [57] propose
Proofs of Presence (PoP) based resilient techniques against
malicious users. The paper present facts indicating that the
use of context-aware PoPs for verification of users’ location
claims is vulnerable to context guessing attacks. Furthermore,
it proposes two countermeasures to mitigate context-guessing
attacks. The first countermeasure called “surprisal filtering” is
based on profiling and estimating the entropy associated with
individual PoPs. The second countermeasure suggests the use
of longitudinal observations of ambient physical properties of
the context. In [88], the authors investigate and discuss the
trade-off issues between users’ location privacy protection and
their Quality of Service (QoS) for the LBSs.
The basis of LBS comes from spatial and temporal big
data, which is provided by an enormous amount of mobile
devices through GPS and various communication networks
(e.g., cellular networks and WiFi). Using LBS to perform co-
presence detection poses a significant threat to user privacy. To
address this issue, various privacy preservation LBS schemes
have been proposed in recent literature. For example, the
authors in [87] first investigate the privacy issues in LBSs
concerning possibilities of sensitive data leakage and then
propose an approach that preserves query data intending to
provide accurate LBS answers with zero-server-knowledge
on query data. In most of the state-of-the-art schemes for
privacy preservation in LBS, a single trusted anonymizer is
placed between the users and the location service provider
(LSP). However, it limits privacy guarantees and incurs high
communication overhead when used in continuous LBSs. It
is because once the anonymizer is compromised, it may
put the user data at risk. Authors in [89] propose a dual
privacy preserving technique for continuous LBSs to protect
the users’ trajectory and query content privacy. In this ap-
proach, multiple anonymizers are placed between users and
LSP, which are combined with Shamir threshold mechanism,
dynamic pseudonym mechanism, and K-anonymity technique.
Similarly, to achieve an adequate balance among user privacy,
usability, and efficiency in LBSs, authors in [90] proposes
SPOIL, which is a practical location privacy approach for
LBSs. In particular, the idea is that a client (i.e., mobile
device) shifts user-intended point-of-interests (POIs) to some
neighboring POIs and query the mapping server using the
shifted POIs.
IV. OPEN ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
In this section, we present the lessons learned from our
survey that includes an array of security threats to the ZIA
systems, and the state-of-the-art context-based co-presence
detection techniques that have been proposed to improve the
security and privacy of various applications which uses these
systems. Additionally, we discuss open issues and directions
for future work that could lead to possible improvements in
securing the ZICDA systems.
Based on our survey, the context-aware co-presence detec-
tion is emerging as a promising approach for defense against
the relay attacks, which is considered as a significant threat
to ZICDA systems. In context-based co-presence detection
techniques, the contextual information is gathered from the
surrounding environments that mainly includes audio-radio
environment (e.g., ambient audio, WiFi, Bluetooth, infrared,
and GPS, and combinations thereof) and physical environ-
ment (temperature, pressure, humidity, gas and altitude, and
combinations thereof). Apart from contextual information
based techniques, the distance bounding (DB) protocols have
also shown significant potential in resisting various distance-
hijacking attacks [91] [92]. However, the use of distance
bounding protocols in resource-constrained devices such as
sensors, low-end smartphones, and smartcards are not suit-
able [93]. It is due to the multitude of hardware compo-
nents and the multi-process architecture that is being used
to implement the distance bounding techniques, which leads
to unpredictable performance behaviour. In particular, these
protocols interact at the physical layer, thus, the dedicated
hardware is mandatory for practical implementations. There-
fore, widespread deployment of DB protocols must await
manufacturer endorsement.
In the state-of-the-art, various types of context information
that could be extracted from different sensor modalities such
as magnetometers, accelerometer, GPS, and gyroscope, is used
as contextual information to discover the co-presence between
prover and verifier. Researchers have used single or a set
of sensor modalities to generate some contextual signature
that when matched up to a given threshold, the prover and
verifier are considered within each others proximity. It can
be deduced from the surveyed techniques that the use of
multiple modalities provides more resistance to relay attacks
and higher accuracy (i.e., lower false positives and false
negatives). However, as the number of modality increases
in the contextual set, the usability of the system decreases
and the cost of the deployment increases. Additionally, the
availability of the multiple sensor modalities depends on the
device capabilities and the surrounding environment where the
co-presence is being checked.
Despite the availability of a broad array of context-aware co-
presence detection techniques, the various types of distance-
hijacking attacks still threaten the secure and efficient deploy-
ment of different emerging applications, e.g., secure message
exchange in VANETs [86], two-factor authentication for user
identification [94], and secure device pairing and service
creation in IoT [95] [96]. The correct implementation and
functionality of these applications are based on the concept
of contextual co-presence. Below, we discuss the challenges
and future research directions that require significant research
attention to improve the security of ZICDA systems and the
privacy of its users.
• Integration of proximity proofs: To integrate context-
based co-presence schemes in a target system, the first
requirement is the availability of the adequate context.
However, having the context availability alone is not suf-
ficient, it should be in the correct format or mechanism,
and it should be validated to ensure that it is accurate and
has integrity. Once the contextual information is available
in an accurate, up-to-date, and validated format, it needs
to be integrated based on key values, and a platform
is required that enables the log. Additionally, alert data
to be linked together with the contextual information is
required to allow for efficient integration of contextual
information in real-time. Finally, the system must have
the capability to make the integrated information quickly
and readily available to security analysts to present a
“scenario” that provides all of the information required
to validate, respond to, and mitigate possible security-
related incidents. Performing the integration is easy if the
system components (e.g., prover and verifier) only need
software updates, but in cases where hardware updates are
required, the development of the appropriate infrastruc-
ture is necessary. In particular, how to deploy contextual
co-presence detection solutions cost-effectively and effi-
ciently remains a research problem to address for future
researchers.
• Usable solutions: The use of contextual information is
rapidly increasing in various application domains which
include financial (e.g., Point-of-Sale, and multi-factor au-
thentication for online and offline transactions) as well as
non-financial (e.g., supply chain management, smartcard-
based access, and medical implants) applications. There-
fore, high usability becomes an essential requirement.
However, the use of multiple sensor modalities for context
gathering not only increases the cost of deployment, but it
also decreases the usability of the system, which directly
effects the quality-of-service (QoS) perceived by the end-
users. Therefore, selecting an optimal yet minimal set
of sensor modalities that effectively consider the tradeoff
between the security, cost, and usability of the system
remains an open issue.
• Resistance against context manipulations: Most of
the state-of-the-art co-presence detection or relay attack
resistance mechanisms consider the simplest adversary
model (i.e., Dolev-Yao systems), hence these mechanisms
might not be able to defend the system in the presence of
an active adversary (i.e., context manipulating attackers).
The existing research shows that it is trivial to mod-
ify, consistently control, and stabilize the context data
gathered from different (single or multiple) audio-radio
and physical environments using low-cost, off-the-shelf
equipment [73]. Therefore, extensive research is required
to ensure the robustness of the access control systems
against distance hijacking attacks. For instance, the clas-
sifier and machine learning algorithms that are being used
to train the system should consider the possibility of a
strong adversary during the training phase. Also, the size
of the training data set should be large enough, and it
should exhibit the characteristics of the real-world data.
• Privacy preserving proximity detection: In most of the
available co-presence detection approaches, the context
information consists of sensitive user data such as lo-
cation, audio, and behavioural patterns. Therefore, it is
essential to ensure the use of such contextual information
in a privacy-preserving manner. However, it is hard to
ensure privacy in co-presence systems due to the need for
precise information that these systems require to perform
the co-presence evaluation. For instance, it is hard to use
the partial GPS information [97] and still do an accurate
evaluation for co-presence. Hence, novel solutions are
required to ensure privacy preservation during proximity
detection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When a user tries to access a system, one can simplify
the security decisions by basing it on binary choices (i.e.,
Yes or No). However, for the rapidly increasing thefts against
logging credentials that are caused by the human or the system
related errors, such binary decisions are not enough to protect
the system. Therefore, if the verifier can base the security
decisions on the who, when, where, when, what, and why
behind the user’s access request, it can develop usable security
and privacy solutions for users without sacrificing the level
of protection. This paper examines several ways that make
use of a context-aware model (a new and adaptive security
model), which feeds additional information to the Security
Analytic Engine (SAE) to create efficient and flexible security
decisions. In this paper, we start with the discussion on
various real-world applications (e.g., PKE systems, contactless
smartcard-based access control systems, contactless payment
systems, inventory management, medical implants, and e-
passport) and security threats (relay attack, terrorist fraud,
location cheating, and impersonation) with respect to the
ZICDA access control systems. We provided a comprehensive
survey that includes all the state-of-the-art context-based co-
presence detection techniques along with their merits and
limitations. With the set of future research directions and
challenges that we have discussed, we hope that our work will
motivate fledgling researchers towards tackling the security,
usability, and privacy issues of ZICDA systems.
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